Articles Posted in Corporations

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What is the Corporate Transparency Act?

In 2021, Congress passed the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) as part of the sprawling National Defense Authorization Act.[1] The law, which took effect January 1, 2024, “packs a significant regulatory punch, requiring most entities incorporated under State law to disclose personal stakeholder information to the Treasury Department’s criminal enforcement arm.”[2]  Entities covered by the law include, with some exceptions, corporations, limited liability companies, and similar entities created in the United States by filing documentation with the secretary of state or similar office, or formed under foreign law and registered to do business in the United States.[3]  Failure to report can result in both civil and criminal penalties.[4]

Case Ruling the Corporate Transparency Act Unconstitutional

On March 1, 2024, a federal judge in Alabama ruled that the CTA is unconstitutional. The lawsuit, brought by the National Small Business Association (“NSBA”) and one if its members, argued that the CTA exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.[5] The Government defended the law’s constitutionality on various grounds, but the court sided with the challengers.

The court first rejected the Government’s argument that the disclosures required by the CTA were needed to protect vital national security interests and thus fell within Congress’ power over foreign affairs and national security. The court acknowledged the great deference entitled to Congress in these areas, but reasoned that corporations are “creatures of state law,” and Congress’ foreign affairs powers “do not extend to purely internal affairs, especially in an arena traditionally left to the States.”[6]

The court next addressed Congress’s power to enact the CTA under the Commerce Clause.  The law could not be upheld as a valid regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as the Government argued, because the CTA by its plain text “doesn’t regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce or prevent their use for a specific purpose.” The CTA simply mandates that covered entities report information to the Treasury Department without any reference to “commerce” or channels or instrumentalities of commerce.[7] The law also could not be upheld under Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activity having “substantial effects” on interstate commerce because “the CTA does not regulate commerce on its face, contain a jurisdictional hook, or serve as an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”[8]

The court finally rejected Congress’s taxing power as a valid basis for the law. The Government argued that because the required information is necessary to ensure appropriate reporting of taxable income, and Treasury officers and employees have access to the information for tax purposes, the CTA was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress’s taxing powers.  But, as the court explained, the Government’s theory would allow Congress to “craft a constitutional law [by] simply impos[ing] a disclosure requirement and giv[ing] tax officials access to the information.”

Because the law could not be justified as “an exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers,” the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the CTA violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.[9]

Future of the Corporate Transparency Act

The decision has been appealed and exempts only the plaintiffs in the case from the CTA’s reporting requirement. Those requirements thus remain in effect for other covered entities across the United States.

 

The business litigation group at Silverman Thompson offers free consultations at 800.385.2243. If you have any questions regarding the Corporate Transparency Act and your business, reach out to Bill Sinclair, at 410.385.9116.

 

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In the midst of the Great Depression, Congress enacted two laws to shore up practices that were considered to have led in part to the Market Crash of 1929: the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), which governs initial securities offerings; and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), which governs all subsequent trading. The 1933 Act permits both state and federal courts to hear claims brought under that Act, and bars defendants from removing such claims to federal court. The 1934 Act, however, grants federal court exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims brought under that Act.

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In its 2009 decision in Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, the Court of Appeals of Maryland inserted a caveat in the premise that shareholder lawsuits against corporate directors must be pursued as a derivative action on behalf of the corporation itself. By declaring that a corporation’s impending sale gave rise to common-law duties by directors that could be enforced directly by shareholders, the high court outlined an exception that risked swallowing the rule. Last month, however, the Court of Special Appeals gave a more thorough explanation about when Shenker applies – and, as to be expected, it’s not as broad as disgruntled shareholders might hope.
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Governments and businesses know – or at least they should – that there’s a difference between being vicariously liable and being directly negligent. Jurors may not, however, so how carefully should the distinction be explained come time for crafting jury questions? Perhaps not much – according to a new opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, provided the jury is otherwise instructed properly by the trial court and counsel, blurring the line between vicarious liability and negligence in a jury question can be excusable.
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Silverman|Thompson|Slutkin|White real estate litigation attorneys succeeded in obtaining summary judgment on behalf of the private owner of a project-based Section 8 housing project in a breach of lease action pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The case involved a determination of whether projects funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development may proceed with eviction upon a showing that drug-related criminal activity had occurred. Maryland law previously required that, after adducing evidence that a tenant had breached their lease by engaging in drug-related criminal activity, the landlord also prove that the breach was material, substantial and warranted eviction, thereby allowing a judge or jury to countermand the landlord’s decision to evict. The ruling by the Honorable Laurence P. Fletcher-Hill, which has wide implications for all federally-funded housing projects, held that Maryland law is preempted by federal law to the extent it would permit a judge or jury to review a HUD-assisted landlord’s decision to proceed with the eviction of a tenant who has committed drug-related criminal activity. As a result, if a federally-assisted landlord can prove by undisputed fact that a tenant has engaged in drug-related criminal activity in or near the leased premises, the landlord has established grounds for eviction as a matter of law and is entitled to terminate the lease.
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Civil litigators know that the impending bankruptcy of an opponent is bad news for any lawsuit that’s ongoing or in the works: Bankruptcy operates as an automatic stay of any state-court litigation against the debtor until the bankruptcy gets resolved. Oddly, however, the precise effect of such a stay was an open question in Maryland up until last month. With Kochhar v. Bansal, Md. Ct. Spec. App., Sept. Term 2014, No. 435 (Feb. 27, 2015), the state now joins the majority of other jurisdictions in deeming any and all proceedings and filings after a bankruptcy stay as void, and not merely voidable.
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Toward the end of last year, I attended a discovery conference in D.C. Throughout the panel discussions of the proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and various electronic discovery resources, I found myself thinking about the practical application to my current cases and future client representation. In other words, I was wondering how it applied to my legal practice and my clients.
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For users of the popular Pandora Internet Radio website, the day the music dies has been delayed for at least a few more years. That’s thanks to U.S. District Court Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York, who earlier this month saved the music service from being stripped of its rights to play songs owned by major record companies Sony/EMI, Warner, Universal, and BMG. It’s a case showing that the ever-shifting legal landscape regarding online music consumption is still in many ways tied to the Golden Age of Radio.

For those who aren’t familiar (and if you’re a music fan, definitely check it out), Pandora works by playing songs that correspond to a general type of music or artist that the user selects. The listener can give positive or negative feedback for each song that plays, allowing the site to narrow its selections to songs that the listener is more likely to enjoy. Along the way, links are provided so that users can easily buy the songs or albums from online retailers. Combined with its popular streaming service and mobile app, this nifty little audio experiment has turned into big business: Pandora reportedly has more than 150 million registered users and is valued at $2.6 billion, having pulled in $427.1 million in revenue is Fiscal Year 2013.
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The processes of setting and communicating prices are two of the most fundamental roles of a business. Price affects a business’s sales, revenue, investment returns, and ultimately profit. As a result, the term “price fixing” has a strong negative connotation, and deservedly so. Restrictions on price competition represent actual threats to the economy, and they carry the possibility of harsh penalties. However, the term sometimes may be misused in reference to pro-competitive, legal conduct, which actually may be beneficial for businesses and consumers.

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Delaware law permits a court to pierce the corporate veil of a company and hold its owners personally liable “where there is fraud or where [the corporation] is in fact a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its owner.” See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del.Ch.1992). In order to state a claim for piercing the corporate veil under the “alter ego” theory, a party must show (1) that the corporation and its principals sought to be held liable operated as a single economic entity, and (2) that an overall element of injustice or unfairness is present. See, e.g., Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc., 583 F.Supp.2d 521, 528 (D. Del. 2008) (applying Delaware law). The fraud or injustice that must be demonstrated in order to pierce the corporate veil must be found in the principal’s use of the corporate form. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 267 (1989); Blair v. Infineon Technologies AG, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 473 (D. Del. 2010).
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Generally, it is the rule that a corporate director is not personally liable for the misconduct of co-directors where he or she has not participated in the misconduct. See, e.g., Seale v. Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 806 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1986). Corporate officers and directors can only become personally liable if they directly authorize or actively participate in the wrongful or tortious conduct complained of by a third party. See, e.g., Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 103 (1990). In other words, directors ordinarily will not be held liable for wrongdoing over which they have no practical control. See, e.g., Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 89 N.C. App. 41 (1988).
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Generally speaking, a Maryland corporation provides protection to individuals from personal liability associated with debts of the corporate entity. When a plaintiff or creditor is able to go after an owner’s personal assets, it is commonly called “piercing the corporate veil”.

Maryland law is crystalline that the corporate entity will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity. The mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by one individual or a few individuals will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding corporateness Continue reading →

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